Ethiopia's Military "Option" To Its Conflict With
Eritrea Is Another Mirage.

By Prof. Habtamu Bihonilign
September 3, 1999
bihonilign@hotmail.com

I do not think it's necessary for me to start this
article by trying to convince anyone of what is, by
now, most obvious; i.e., the fact that Ethiopia is
hell-bent on pursuing a military "solution" to the
present conflict between Eritrea and itself. If
anyone who claims to have been following recent events
has not come to this realization, I can only say that
such a person is in a decidedly receding, if not
disappearing, minority.

Of late, the government has abandoned even the
slightest pretension of hiding behind the familiar
"peace" phraseology. Ethiopia's initial official
response to so-called "Technical Arrangements" clearly
stated that as far as it was concerned, Ethiopia's
oft-repeated military option (with a "capital M")
still held utmost priority in the thinking of the TPLF
leaders. This stance was reiterated by Mr. Abay
Tsehaye, a senior politburo (a strange term in 1999 -
a throw back to the old Soviet days) member. He
declared as much in a closed session held for the
benefit of TPLF sympathizers in the "comrade's" most
recent visit to the US. Without mincing words, he
stated, "We [the TPLF] must break Eritrea's back
militarily first." This article will examine the
futility of such thinking.

1. Who in Ethiopia is particularly pushing for the
military "option"?
When the conflict initially made headlines, the
reaction of most Ethiopians, as I am sure of Eritreans
as well was utter disbelief. It hit us all like a blot
of lightening. "What in heaven's name just happened?"
was the question that dropped out of the mouths of
most peoples'. For those who understand the
destructiveness of war and for those to whom the past
bloodletting is still fresh in their memories, the
news of hostility breaking out had to have been the
horror of all horrors. What made this development
difficult to accept was that many in Ethiopia, despite
the dissatisfaction over the divisive ethnic policies
of this government, were growing used to the notion
that Ethiopia might have finally outgrown war. It
didn't take very long before the Ethiopian parliament
dashed the people's hopes and offered its fateful
ultimatum and the subsequent declaration of war on
June 13, 1998. Regardless of which party to the
conflict was at fault, the action of the parliament
was hasty, at best. It got the country into an
intractable diplomatic and military logjam. From that
point on, those who deliberately instigated the
conflict have spoken of "peace" only in so far as it
served them as a smoke screen for their war
preparations.

Again, to have a better understanding of the 'modus
operandi' of the war-mongering clique in Addis Ababa
cum Mekele, one would have to look at the two distinct
messages they put out about their intentions. What the
local official government media churns out for the
citizens, and the press releases of the Foreign
Ministry designed for foreign consumption have always
been contradictory. While the latter, until recently,
paid a confused lip service to peace, the former never
even bothered at such attempts and stuck to that most
familiar monotone script, "We will annihilate
Eritrea."

Once the euphoria of deceptive promises and the
anxiety resulting from being "invaded" dissipated,
divergent, disturbing and cynical views soon emerged
among various segments of Ethiopians. Many of those
who had accepted the independence of Eritrea, not
necessarily out of principle but only as a 'fait
accompli', easily reverted to their former
anti-independence views. Those, who with some
legitimacy and mostly Amaras, had never accepted the
TPLF as a 'bona fide' government, much less the
independence of Eritrea, were often heard making a
cynical remark. "Oh, Good!" they said, "The Tigrayans
and Eritreans will now finish each other off for us."
The cynicism of this view rests in the fact that its
proponents perceive war between two countries as
something easily containable within certain sub-groups
in one's own country and easily manipulate it to suit
one's short-term political agenda. Once begun, war,
they forget, is like a prairie fire taking a life of
its own.

Another new group soon emerged from nowhere. These are
people who have never experienced first hand, the
devastating effects of war. They view it as something
akin to a horseshoe game at a Sunday afternoon picnic.
This group, often too distant to know the horrors of
past wars, has a tendency to see the conflict as mere
Nintendo game. I have been disheartened to see this
new generation of "electronic warriors" whose
specialized "military training" is limited to video
arcades had the temerity to go so far as offering
their "expert" advice on military strategies from a
world away on how to conduct and win the war against
Eritrea. The dangerousness of this group lies in
their naivete and gullibility. I see them often being
used by those who know exactly what they are doing.

The die-hard militarists have consistently been those
within the ranks of the TPLF, with the
Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) at the core.
This is the cabal that controls every facet of life
in Ethiopia today. The reason for this group's sworn
position to forge ahead on the warpath is discussed in
a previous article. It suffices to mention here that
behind all the facades they put up, all of this
group's decisions and actions are predicated on
achieving their all too familiar and historic "Greater
Tigrai" scheme. This is the one and only 'casus
belli' - not the border, the economy, etc.

As time wore out, and to an increasingly lesser
degree, the satellite organizations within the EPRDF
have taken an ambivalent and vacillating stance. The
support these organizations offer is largely due to
the fact that they owe their existence and their
extremely limited powers in their respective 'kilils'
(regions) to the TPLF - their creator and patron.

2. Eritrea is an anvil that has worn out many hammers
The government of Atse Haile Selassie embarked upon
its attempts at "solving" the Eritrean dilemma
militarily. It began this policy simultaneously with
its scrapping of the Ethio-Eritrean federal
arrangement. The thinking at the time was quite
simple. Pacify the Eritrean opposition among the
intelligentsia and the labor unions by overawing and
overpowering them with military and police presence.
This, it was thought, would take care of things in no
time.

What followed, of course, was something entirely
different. As all means of expression of dissent were
muffled and the opposition were killed, jailed, or
exiled, the anti-Ethiopian reaction in Eritrea began
to take the form of armed struggle. The 1960s was a
period in which the Eritrean peoples' struggle dealt
with two important issues. While on one hand the
struggle grew by lips and bounds commensurate to the
repressive measures instituted by the government; on
the other hand, the movement's internal contradictions
were being exacerbated.

In the very early 1970s the Ethiopian student
movement, the issues surrounding the famine in
northern Ethiopia and the varied socio- political
crisis throughout the empire attained the requisite
internal critical mass necessary for the collapse of
the 'ancien regime'. In the final analysis, however,
it was the 2nd Division of the Ethiopian armed forces
stationed in Eritrea, which had long borne the brunt
of the ever-growing military casualty that got the
ball rolling. In their long list of grievances, the
army correctly concluded that the war in Eritrea could
not be solved militarily. They became the first
organized body in Ethiopian history to jettison the
notion of military solutions for problems that can and
should be solved politically. With support from other
segments of the armed forces, these also became
important catalysts for the overthrow of the monarchy.

The coming of the dergue did show initially the
promise of peaceful resolution in Eritrea. Even if it
is short lived, resolving the Eritrean problem
peacefully became the new mantra - a shibboleth. It
didn't, however, take too long for the clique within
the PMAC, led by Colonel Mengistu, to usurp power and
change the course of events.

It is not within the scope of this article to analyze
either the emergence, the internal dynamics of the
dergue, or the Ethio-Eritrean war, which ended in
1991. The point of focus here is simple. By 1976 the
new military leaders of Ethiopia, again with Mengistu
Haile Mariam at the helm, had reversed the anti-war
views and concluded that Ethiopia's war in Eritrea was
winnable. To do so, what Ethiopia needed, in their
thinking, was more men and weapons. Armed with this
belief, the dergue led Ethiopia on another
steeplechase. For seventeen years the Mengistu regime
sacrificed scores of thousands of men and squandered a
lion's share of the country's meager resources - all
for naught. Mengistu persisted on the military option
right up to his down fall. There is no doubt that his
demise, as that of the monarchy before him, is
directly linked to the war in Eritrea.

It is important to note here that the 1989 attempted
military coup d'etat by the best and the brightest in
the military top brass, mainly those stationed in
Eritrea, had an uncanny resemblance to the events of
1974. The leaders of this unsuccessful bid to
overthrow Mengistu had just as correctly concluded
that the war in Eritrea could never be settled
militarily. These leaders experienced their own
epiphany following that fateful Battle of Afabet,
which David Basil likened to the debacle at Dien Bien
Phu. Unfortunately for these generals, their
ineptitude and the sabotage by opportunist elements in
their midst resulted in their wholesale massacre by
Mengistu.

These days there are unconfirmed reports that even old
Mengistu has thrown in his two-cents worth on issues
of war and peace from his exile in Harare (before he
left for N. Korea, that is). He supposedly shared his
belated "wisdom" by stating, "If we [the dergue]
couldn't win that war with all that we had, what makes
the fools in Mekele think they can!" If this "latrine
rumor" has any kernel of truth in it, I say, "Hurrah!"
for the human spirit. It just might be possible to
teach that old dog a new trick after all.

3. Changed equation: the futility of the military
"option". Nothing can show the futility of the
military adventurism of the present Ethiopian
government than a brief comparison and contrast of the
present situation to that of the era of the dergue.
This comparison is of crucial importance in that it
shows Eritrea is today the strongest it has ever been
since the beginning of its armed struggle almost forty
years ago. Now, I know this is a hard fact to swallow
to many. Be that as it may, conversely, Ethiopia's
relative position and strength has precipitously
declined to its weakest point since the 1980s - the
period in which Ethiopia had transformed itself into a
veritable military state with the help of the Soviet
Union and other powerful benefactors.

At the height of the Mengistu regime, Ethiopia had
close to half a million man under arms, led by some of
the best trained and ablest generals and officers.
According to reliable military intelligence reports,
during this period the Ethiopian government was
pronounced as having the largest and best-equipped air
force in the continent south of the Sahara, South
Africa excepted, of course. It possessed the largest
number of tanks and armored personnel.

The Soviet Union considered the Mengistu regime its
most trusted ally in the continent and spared no
effort to assure not only its survival but its
unquestionable dominance in the continent as well.
Mengistu got anything and everything it asked for in
the form of military hardware, training, and advice -
no question asked. The eleven billion-dollar debt
Ethiopia incurred during this time, mainly for the
purposes of waging the war in Eritrea, is a living
testimony to that commitment.

During this same period, Eritreans were outnumbered
four to one in ground forces. The Ethiopian air force
was indisputably in full control of the skies, with a
major air force base in Asmara and other smaller ones
and airstrips throughout. All the cities and towns
along with 70%-80% of the civilian population of
Eritrea were controlled and administered by Ethiopia.
Ethiopia also was in uncontested possession of
Massawa and Asseb, Eritrea's two strategic ports, as
well as the 1000 kilo meter coastline.

This had enabled Ethiopia to become a major maritime
nation in the region with a relatively strong navy. On
top of all this, the Ethiopian government tightly
controlled and utilized practically every aspect of
Eritrea's economic resources. Ethiopia's own command
economy was geared to bolster the war efforts of the
government.

Diplomatically, despite the fact that the
Ethiopian-Eritrean war was by far Africa's longest and
most devastating, Ethiopia's insistence that the
conflict was "its own internal affair" had found wide
and unquestionable currency. Consequently, the OAU,
the UN, Europe, the United States, etc., much to
Ethiopia's liking, were content to look the other way
as the country hemorrhaged. Except for a few
journalists that managed to slip through the Sudan,
Ethiopia made sure that Eritrea was completely closed
off to journalists and foreigners in general. Not
surprisingly, during much of the war Eritrea remained
as isolated internationally as heaven is from hell.

On the other side of the equation, Eritrea was mired
in internal squabble and a civil war. The Fronts had
withdrawn from most of the territories they had
occupied by 1978 and retreated to the redoubts of
Sahel in northern Eritrea. It is there that the EPLF
regrouped its forces and concentrated on defending its
base area from Ethiopia's massive, concentrated, and
repeated military campaigns without any of the above
mentioned advantages Ethiopia enjoyed.

Reading through some of the most thrilling and
important works on this particular period by scholars
we can't simply dismiss as Eritrean propaganda, one
could reasonably conclude the following. If ever
there were a time for Ethiopia to impose its will on
Eritrea by force of arms, this period would have had
to be the most optimum. Ethiopia had in its grip all
the advantages anyone embarking on any war could ever
wish. On the other hand, the Eritreans seemingly had
all the disadvantages one could possibly wish on one's
enemy. Yet it wasn't to be. Eritrea overcame
Ethiopia's relentless military campaign and finally
triumphed.

The Eritrea of 1999 is a far cry from ten years ago -
not "your grandfather's Oldsmobile" anymore, to borrow
from GM's commercial. The equation is reversed
radically. Never mind those who have been tantalizing
us for the past fifteen months that another war with
Eritrea would be a walkover this time. For anyone who
wants to look at the cold, hard facts, today's picture
is a whole different ball of wax. Look at the results
so far, if any illustration is needed.

The days when Ethiopians were told by their previous
governments that the problem in Eritrea involved only
a few "wenbediewotch" (bandits) is over. Leaders who
might dare try to paint the conflict today as "Arab
instigated and supported", as the former governments
somewhat successfully did, would be laughed straight
out of town. Today, Ethiopians, with some exceptions,
have by and large resigned themselves to the reality
of Eritrea's independence.

Diplomatically, Eritrea is a sovereign nation and
recognized as such by the community of nations. Unlike
during the previous war, the country is in full
control of its territory, including the ports of
Massawa and Asseb. It possesses a small but
respectable air force and a navy. It has an
experienced, well-trained, and disciplined army the
number of which closely matches that of Ethiopia.
Reading independent assessment of its economy by the
same international organizations that assess
Ethiopia's using the same measuring rod (the IMF, the
World Bank, UNDP, etc.), Eritrea doesn't seem to be
doing bad at all.

The entire population Eritrea appears to be more
united in common purpose today more than at any other
time in their history, and unlike most other countries
in Africa. The Eitrean government is far more popular
among its citizens than is the case with the minority
regime in Ethiopia. If anyone is in doubt about this,
as many TPLF propagandists who like to dream up the
worst about Eritrea would have us believe, just refer
to the recent nbelievably warm reception they gave
their president during his visit to the US. When was
the last time an Ethiopian leader received such a
welcome by its people? It is to be remembered that
Ethiopians who couldn't stand the sight of Mr. Meles
Zenawi in his last visit to the US showed their
contempt by pelting him with rotten tomato. Compare
this to the way Isayas, the man certain Ethiopians
love to hate, mixes with his own people within and
outside of the country without any fear for his life -
or of rotten tomato. If the many newspaper accounts
we read about him are half-true, he is often seen in
the most public places in Asmara without the
accompaniment of any security personnel - mind you,
even when they are in a state of war!. When was the
last time any Ethiopian has ever seen Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi or any of MLLT's politburo members taking
a leisurely stroll beyond the confines of their
heavily fortified palace? Think about this the next
time that you refer to Isayas as a "dictator".
Remember this the next time you shade crocodile tears
for the people of Eritrea for living "under the heavy
yoke of his rule." This, in any case, is none of our
business. Let Eritreans worry about that.

4. Prologue For 40 years and a thousand times over the
death knell of Eritrea has been sounded, the funeral
procession formed, the inscription cut on the
tombstone, and committal read - all too prematurely.
In 1969 the London times and many other prestigious
newspapers wrote their epitaph for the end of the
armed struggle following adverse reports of internal
squabble within the ranks of the Eritrean liberation
movement. When the USSR threw all its military and
diplomatic weight behind the Mengistu regime, or
against the Eritrea, The New York Times in 1978 had
declared the Eritrean rebellion "over and done with."
As the dergue's much vaunted, no holds barred Red Star
Campaign, waged to put an end to the war in Eritrea
once and for all, was under way no one gave the
Eritreans a fighting chance. As everyone saw it, the
dergue had put all the manpower and economic resources
of Ethiopia, not to speak of that of the USSR, Cuba,
Korea, South Yemen, the GDR and the other East
European Soviet satellite states, to administer what
all had predicted to be the 'coup de grace'. Mengistu
was sure that it had put all its ducks in a row for
the anticipated and decisive finishing blow.

Many a pundit looked at the balance sheet and again
prematurely wrote the obituary for the Eritrean
peoples' armed struggle. And to be honest, who could
blame them! The obvious arithmetic of the forces
arrayed against each other was convincing enough - one
David against many Goliaths. Even in the most recent
war, using the same old flawed arithmetic, many had
concluded and strangely some still do, that Eritrea
was too small a country for the next door behemoth.
Eritrea, however, remains the same anvil that has worn
out many Ethiopian hammers. If the past is any
indication, as I wholeheartedly believe it is,
Ethiopia's present third-rate hammer will fare no
better on that same anvil.

The dergue refused to learn a lesson or two from the
mistakes of the preceding government. Ethiopia paid
for it dearly. Now, the discredited minority
government in Ethiopia/Mekele has learned a great deal
from its predecessors. The sad thing is that, as a
reading of the government's plagiaristic script shows,
it has learned all the wrong lessons. As a
consequence, it is bound to repeat the same deadly
mistakes. The result this time, however, can be a
catastrophe of epic proportion Ethiopia will never be
able to dig itself out of. The sooner we learn this
lesson of great import the better off we will be
before the country finalizes its downward spiral into
the Balkan-style fragmentation. This process, which
has already been enshrined in the Woyane constitution,
is well underway on the ground as well.

Let me try to make my point with a simple
illustration. My brother-in- law, a successful and
middle aged business man related to me an interesting
story. He could no longer go to Bishoftu (Debre Zeit),
just an hour's drive from Addis to conduct business.
"It has a feel of a foreign country with all the
attendant linguistic and cultural barriers," he
lamented. I am not one to believe even for one minute
that Eritrea is the culprit if Ethiopia splinters into
its many constituent pieces. I am not buying this
propaganda line, which seems to have recently replaced
the "we-are-victims-of-invasion" line. Eritrea never
wrote Ethiopia's constitution. Eritrea never drew up
a map of Ethiopia carving it up into the ethnic
enclaves or "kilils". The TPLF government did all that
without anybody's help. If we have already started
looking for a "fall guy" for what appears to be
inevitable, look no farther than a certain address in
lower 'Arat Kilo' with a forwarding address to Mekele.
For the recidivist elements and the war-mongers in
Ethiopia that are intent upon turning back the wheels
of history, I say, "Wake up, and smell the coffee."
Your case is hopelessly out of tune with the wishes
and interests of the Ethiopian people. ENOUGH IS
ENOUGH! And if you think that the sons of Ethiopia
will keep on bleeding for your pie-in-the-sky dreams,
my parting word of advice to you is this: "mikerew
mikerew embi kale mekera rasu yimkerew."