The history of Ethiopia has always been one of a single ethnic group dominating the rest. The past 100 years (1885-1991) was dominated by the Amhara from central Ethiopia. Starting 1991, Ethiopia has found itself under the harsh rule of the minority Tigrayan group led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The Tigrayans make up less than 5 percent of the Ethiopian population. The majority of people who make up the Ethiopian empire are the Oromos, but for the past 100 years they have been dominated by the Abyssinians (Amhara + Tigrayans).
The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) claims to have formed a constitutional government that divides Ethiopia along ethnic lines. Each ethnic group have the right to secede. Yet starting at the drawing up of Ethiopia's constitution, these provisions of dividing Ethiopia along ethnic lines and allow any region that wants to secede to do so, were two of the most opposed articles by the people of Ethiopia. This policy, that the world saw fail in Yugoslavia, is criticized by the international community as the most dangerous endeavor taken up by an African country. One must ask then, why was it included in the constitution?
By dividing Ethiopia along ethnic lines, the TPLF has eliminated opposition to its rule. In short the TPLF is using the old tactic of "divide and rule". It is trying to remove chances of its enemies collaborating together to take power away from it. Any ethnic group that threatens its power finds itself prosecuted with a style that far surpasses that of the Derg. The Oromos who make up the majority of Ethiopia are the most crucified. Their vanguard organization the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) is banned and its members are hunted. Human rights violations against the people of Oromia and against all the other ethnic groups have been reported by Human Rights Watch and several other humanitarian organizations.
If secession was meant to relieve oppressed ethnic groups then it is a well-documented fact that the constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination has been and remains denied to those who asked for it. Human Rights Watch in its 1999 report, reports “Tensions persisted between the government and ethnic fronts which withdrew from earlier alliances with the EPRDF [TPLF] over their insistence that constitutionally guaranteed self-determination rights be immediately exercised in their regions. Sporadic clashes occurred in Oromia and Somali regional states between government troops and fighters from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) respectively”. (http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/africa/ethiopia.html").
Consider the following: the TPLF initially started its struggle against the Derg to liberate Tigray from Ethiopia, there bye the name "People's Liberation Front". To this effect, the TPLF leaders had published "Republic of Greater Tigrai" manifesto. But Tigray with no outlet to the sea and no natural resource to speak of, had a slim chance of making it on its own. This must have borne greatlyon the Tigrean ruling class when they temporarily suspended their plan. While the right to secede has been temporarily suspended, make no mistake the plan to create a "GREATER TIGRAI" is preceding full steam.
Tigray is now substantially different from the way it was before 1991 in size and in the economic advantage it has over all the other parts of Ethiopia. When Ethiopians complain of Tigray's unfair advantage, it is not with out reason. In a report published in 1997 by John Young, Young points out, the establishment of Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) with considerable amount of capital from
1. non-military equipment captured from the Derg
2. companies established during and after liberation by the TPLF
3. Financial contributions from supportive non-governmental organizations
4. Limited funds made available by the TPLF
5. Money borrowed from state-owned commercial banks of Ethiopia and
6. Investment capital derived from joint ventures with private companies
(The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35 1(1997), pp. 81-99 Copyright
1997 Cambridge University Press “Development and Change in
Post-Revolutionary Tigray”)
The TPLF was a liberation front that had fought from the hills and jungles of Tigray and had no companies in its possession. Any company established must have come after the liberation years namely after 1991. The Derg had nationalized private companies. These companies were never returned to their rightful owners. It is also common knowledge that during EFFORT's fund-raising parties, many business men and women and non-governmental organizations give considerable financial contributions hoping to be viewed favorably by the directors of EFFORT who are all members of the TPLF. For example the chairman of EFFORT is Siye Abraha, a member of the TPLF Politburo and former Minister of Defense.
Unlike other parts of Ethiopia, who do not have the benefit of EFFORT, Tigray now has or is in the process of constructing (from Young’s report)
1. Textile and clothing workshops at Adwa
2. A leather tannery and product factory at Wukro
3. A marble quarry in Sheraro
4. An industrial plan at Mekelle that is intended to reduce the prohibitively
high cost of cement, which currently has to be brought in from Addis Ababa.
5. A pharmaceutical firm at Adigrat and
6. Guna, a sizeable and diversified enterprise which provides loans,
seeds, and tractors to farmers in the commercially significant Humera area
in the far west, as well as purchasing and transporting their crops to
markets.
(The Journal of Modern African Studies, 35 1(1997), pp. 81-99 Copyright
1997 Cambridge University Press “Development and Change in
Post-Revolutionary Tigray”)
Young, further attests, private companies “have not been able to compete on an even playing field, not least since the issuing of government licenses favors party-affiliated enterprises. In addition, NGOs such as REST and TDA are not subject to the same taxation as private companies, and thus have lower costs of operation. Thirdly, there is no disguising the alarm felt in various business circles by the scale of EFFORT’s operations, which according to some estimates have been cost at over 1,000 million Birr (circa US$150 million) and certainly reach far beyond Tigray.”
While the economy of Tigray is greatly benefiting from Ethiopia’s coffers, there remained one other problem. Young reports, “The fact that landlessness had already become a serious problem by 1996, despite the continuing system of land tenure.” To accommodate this growing Tigrayan problem, a new map was drawn that did away with boundaries inherited from Haile Selassie and the Derg and one that incorporates fertile lands from neighboring Wollo, Gondar, and the now famous Badme area from Eritrea (The New Tigray map). While the rights of Eritrean farmers that were thrown out of Badme plain, to make room for the Tigrayans, has finally been taken up by the Eritrean government and without a doubt will be protected, the rights of farmers from Wollo, and Gondar remains largely ignored. After all, who can a farmer in Wollo or Gondar complain to when the thief, the police, and the judge are all one and the same - the TPLF leadership?
Eritrea’s impeccable record on respecting the rights of Ethiopians in Eritrea has been witnessed by various organizations - Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, UN, EU to name a few. Ethiopians do not need to go further, they can simply ask the over 130,000 Derg soldiers that were captured during the liberation years; they were given the best treatment and released in 1991. There is a video of their departure that shows them thanking the EPLF for the wonderful treatment they received and how happy they were to be going to join their family. The Prime Minster Meles Zenawi, in one of his interviews, also defended the act and explains the nature of their departure (The text of the interview can be viewed at http://www.denden.com/Conflict/media/meles-1991.htm). Unfortunately, Ethiopians are now attempting to equate this with the inhumane deportation of the over 55,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin.
What is more, Ethiopia is now busy accusing Eritrea of invading it, yet “in the final analysis what they call theirs and what we claim to be ours is going to overlap and it is this overlap that should be demilitarized. We are ready to make short-term compromises in order to get a long-term solution.” (President Isaias Afewerki, May 14, 1998) If TPLF’s short-term as well as long-term gain was not in war, then why has the TPLF:
1. Refused to negotiate by putting an unacceptable pre-condition.
“In the Ethiopian capital Monday, state radio quoted Foreign Minister Seyoum
Mesfin as saying his country would reject international mediation efforts
until Eritrea unconditionally withdrew its troops.” (Ethiopia
Eritrea still at odds over border 18 May 1998 Reuters). Why is
the TPLF afraid to negotiate if they have a legitimate claim?
2. Claim to have accepted a negotiated settlement fully when in fact it hasn’t. The U.S. Rawanda Plan calls for “resolving this and any other dispute between them by peaceful means; renouncing force as a means of imposing solutions”. The OAU proposal for a peaceful solution also calls for “rejection of the use of force as a means of imposing solutions to disputes”.
3. Add conditions that clearly are not part of the fully accepted OAU’s proposal to impede its implementations. To the Eritrean question on “What is meant by environs? Which areas does it include?” the OAU replied with “Environs refer to the area surrounding Badme Town.” The TPLF is now claiming “THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF THE AGREEMENT”. Are we to forget what is actually spelled out?
4. Never produced a map that shows the totality of its claim – perhaps to claim more land at a later time.
Ethiopia’s representative to the U.N. Dr. Tekeda Alemu, in his address
to the United Nations on March 24, 1999, admitted that Badme came
“at great sacrifice on the part of those Ethiopian patriots”. This
coming from an Ethiopian official means that Ethiopia has lost scores of
thousands of lives. To this, add the great human sacrifice made at Tsorena
in mid March in what independent reporters had called a "human slaughter".
Tigrayans make up only 5 percent of Ethiopia and if each ethnic group were
to equally participate in the defense of Ethiopia as Prime Minister Meles
claimed, then Tigrayans would represent 1 in 20. Considering the large
number of Tigrayans in leadership position, who is actually being used
as a cannon fodder becomes clear. No wonder "[TPLF] have been prepared
to accept casualty figures that are usually regarded as unacceptable in
modern warfare." (The Economist, March 13-19, 1999). This has become
a favorite way of eliminating any opposition that would threaten TPLF’s
dominant position in Ethiopian politics for a long time to come.
By indefinitely continuing the war, the TPLF can also postpone elections
indefinitely that are scheduled for year 2000. An election that TPLF
is guaranteed to loose. In the mean time, in an event someone manages
to take power away from the TPLF, then Ethiopia would find itself zapped
of its most valuable human resource and heavily indebted to resist the
secession of a rich and industrially powerful “GREATER TIGRAI”.
