Unrelenting Search for the Deal Breaker
By Tekie Fessehatzion, Sat, 28 Aug 1999

The international community is about to find out what Eritrea has known
right from the start. Ethiopia's minority controlled government has never
been interested in a peace full resolution to its conflict with Eritrea. Now
the world will understand fully who has been for peace, and who for continued
war. All along Eritrea has been for peace, Ethiopia has been creating excuses
upon excuses why it can't go for a lasting peace unless it's on its own terms.
Although Ethiopia is too coy to say it publicly, what it desparately wants to
do is to annul the OAU's Charter's stand on the sanctity of colonial era
borders.

Ethiopia is no more interested in a long term peace than it is--to use Abay
Tsehai's phrase as quoted by a VOA correspondent a few weeks ago in a speech
he gave in Washington, "to break Eritrea's spinal cord." The TPLF Chief
Political Commissar's chilling warning was made in Amharic at the same time
the OAU was putting together answers as per Ethiopia's request on
clarifications on the Technical Arrangements. Eritrea had already accepted and
the world has been waiting for Ethiopia to do like wise.

Ethiopia's minority controlled government has perfected "bait and switch"
as "high" art diplomacy. Every time a deal appeared imminent, Ethiopia
searched high and low for the right deal breaker. Ethiopia has never been for
peace; just talked the game about peace. For a long time Ethiopia
successfully camouflaged its real intentions by talking smoothly to the
international media. It received a lot of help, a lot of hand holding from the
American Embassy in Addis.

Ethipian officials talked peace in English; war in Amharic; and revenge
in Tigrinya. Telling people what they wanted to hear, in the language they
understood. Ethiopia's leaders knwo that the international donors want peace;
the Amhara intellectuals wish to do aaway with Eritrea's independence; and
TPLF's followers are dreaming of conquest. Fulfilling everyone's fantasy seems
the road the TPLF has taken. It was clever, too clever, unfortunately it's
more like a Ponzee Scheme soon to collapse under its own weight. Eritreans who
speak at least two of the languages know what is going on-- a desperate
attempt by the newly minted "Ethiopians" within TPL trying to cling to power
by any means necessary. This has been the story all along, although much of
the outside world did know much about it. Now the world will listen.
After Ethiopia's rejection of the Technical Arrangements, the world has no
choice but pay attention. The bait and switch pattern, the relentless search
for a deal breaker is there for anyone to see.

At first when the US/Rwanda plan came to the picture, Ethiopia was all out for
the plan, particularly when Eritrea expressed reservation about the fairness
of the plan. Ethiopia cranked its diplomatic machinery full throttle to let
the world know how Ethiopia was for peace and Eritrea was not. Then came the
Framework Agreements. Again Eritrea showed reservation, and Ethiopia declared
to anyone who would listen, Ethiopia was all for it. "Everything in the plan
was acceptable to Ethiopia", was the refrain Ethiopian officials, comfortable
in their knowledge that Eritrea did not accept it. Ethiopia had no intention
of accepting the plan, but as long as Eritrea did not come aboard, it was a
golden opportunity for Ethiopia to appear reasonable and peace loving. Of
course, it never was either, but never mind, it served a purpose--a huge
purpose. A priceless propaganda payoff at Eritrea's expense.

After Eritrea accepted the Framework, Ethiopia demurred insisting on a
reinterpretation of a key clause, in one of a series of attempts to break
the peace deal. Ethiopia insisted Badme and ints environs meant the
whole enchalada, the full 1000km long border. It was a propesterous
interpretation, but neither the OAU Secretariat nor the US State
Department were willing to take Ethiopia to task. The silence gave
Ethiopia the license to continue the war. Eritrea rejected the outlandish
new interpretation. Ethiopia continued to paint Eritrea "against
peace". It was a topsy turvy world--the warmonger appearing the peace lover.
Eritrea's insistence on literal interpretation of the Framework gave Ethiopia
the excuse to continue the war while appearing committed to peace.

The gambit worked for a while. Then came the Algiers Summit and the OAU
Modalities for the Implementation of the Framework Agreement. Eritrea
shocked Ethiopia by accepting the Modalities, including the clause
Ethiopia had been demanding that Eritrea returned to the pre May 6, 1998
position. Both governments agreed to let the OAU prepare the necessary
technical arrangements to implement the Framework and its Modalities. The
OAU, with assistance from the UN and the US, did just that. Eritrea
accepted the Technical Arrangements. Ethiopia asked for clarifications.
Initially the press reports indicated that the clarifications were minor
and that Ethiopia would finally sign. Well not quite. Ethiopia was back to
its old trick--bait and switch.

More ominously for the peace process government controlled papers in Addis
started hinting that all was not well with the Technical Arrangements, and
that Ethiopia may be forced to use, as one Ethiopian expert said it, the
"war option." Why exercise the "war option" when by all accounts you are on
the verge of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The answer is fairly
simple. War or the threat of war was smart local politics. They whipped
intense nationalism. They bought time. If real peace comes you have a lot to
account for. They have to explain what happened at Tserona,

So if one is as cynical a poletician as the guys running Ethiopia are, you bad
mouth the first real break towards real peace. You attack the Technical
Arrangements. You direct the papers you control to write editorials lambasting
the Technical Arrangments. That's exactly what the Reporter, a paper that
reflects official government opinion, in its editorial of August 24, 1999 to
write: "Now that the plan which was accepted by both sides has been altered in
such a way that Ethiopia would obviously not be able to accept it...the peace
plan has been replaced by another one in the name of "technical arrangements"
. it will probably take another war--and more damage--before peace is given
a chance again."

Did the Technical Arrangements replace the previous plans --the Proposal
for Framework Agreement and the Modalities, as the Ethiopia is alleging?
No, none at all. Although the Modalities changed some aspect of he Framework
at the behest of Ethiopia, and changes Eritrea accepted to nudge Ethiopia
towards peace, there's nothing in the Technical Arrangements that contradicts
the Modalities. If anything Ethiopia insisted in bringing to the Technical
Arrangements clauses or interpretations that were not in the Frameors , and
not in the Modalities.

Let us explore the three documents on some of the issues Ethiopia has
found most worrisome. Ethiopia has asked clarifications on 41 questions on
nine broad issues. Buried deep in these questions and statements is an
unrelenting search for a "deal-breaker," including the reopening of issues
that were agreed to in the previous two documents. If Ethiopia's
interpretation of the Framework and the Modalities were to hold, the Technical
Arrangmenet would introduce language to cripple the settled colonial
treaties that have for a hundred years formed the basis for the borde between
Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Take the question of the restoration of civilian administration, for example.

Framework Agreement:

Article 3 talks about the redeployment of Eritrean forces from Badme and
its environs to the pre May 6 position as a "mark of goodwill" to the OAU.
The same article stated that Eritrea's withdrawal would not "prejudge the
final status" of the area to be decided later through delimitation,
demarcation and possibly arbitration.

Article 4 is about the role the Group of Military Observers in assisting
the reinstated Civilian Administration in the maintenance of law and order
during the interim period.

There are two key points to remember. The Frameworks required Eritrea to
redeploy from Badme and its surroundings, and nowhere else. The civilian
administration was to be reinstated to the same area, and nowhere else.
This is what Ethiopia agreed, when it was certain Eritrea would not accept
the Framework. Ethiopia's acceptance was predicated on the assumption that
because Eritrea wont accept the Framework, Ethiopia could get a "free ride."

After Eritrea accepted the Framework, Ethiopia moved the goal post. It
demanded a reinterpretation of Badme and its environs to include the
entire stretch of the border--about 1000 km. It also demanded Ethiopian
civil administrators to be installed in all of the disputed areas. Both
demands were beyond what was stated in the Proposal for a Framework
Agreement. Ethiopia's reference to the disputed areas as "occupied"
Ethiopian "territories," was a relentless refrain, repeated adinfinitum, to
persuade the outside world that Eritrea had invaded sovereign Ethiopian
territory, notwithstanding to the Framework's unambigous reference that
ownership of the areas should not be prejudged.

Modalities:

Article 1 accedes to Ethiopian blackmail that redeployment to the May 6
positions should cover all the disputed areas, and not Badme and its
environs only, contrary to the Framework's article 3. Eritrea accepts
the change in interpretation to deny Ethiopia the excuse to continue to wage
war. Eritrea decides to make concessions for peace. Contrary to Ethiopia's
insistence the disputed area be called Ethiopian territories, their status
remains unchanged. Article 4 states emphatically, the "redeployment shall not,
in any way, prejudge final status of the territories concerned."

Article 5 states that the modalities for the re-establishment of the
civilian administration and population in the concerned territories shall
be worked out after cessation of hostilities. All along, Ethiopia had insisted
that Eritrea's redeployment should precede cessation of hostilities.


Technical Arrangements

In order to implement the relevant articles in the Framework Agreement and
the Modalities, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea asked the OAU to
prepare Technical Arrangements. Ethiopia's 41 questions about the Technical
were designed to put enough holes in the document to render it useless. The
attempt failed. The Technical Arrangement held up pretty well under Ethiopian
assault. It was a faithful an honest and faithful attempt at implementing the
frameork and Modalities.

Article 8 reiterates that after redeployment and restoration of civilian
administration, the status of the disputed territories will not be
prejudged. Their final status will be determined at the end of the
delimitation and demarcation process.

Article 9 refers to the restoration of civilian administration in the
disputed areas. It called the two governments to commit themselves to the
following:

- Full cooperation with the peacekeeping mission,

- Close cooperation between the restored civilian administration and the
international civilian component of the peacekeeping mission which will
observe compliance by the restored civilian administrators, with
facilitating human rights monitoring with prohibitions of display of
weapons by militia in populated areas where civilian administration is
restored;

The peacekeeping mission will.

-Observe and assist if requested and as appropriate, police areas where
civilian administration is restored;

-Establish as necessary access by the local population to those
mechanisms.

Ethiopia's Request for Clarification and the OAU's Responses

Ethiopia's objections to the Articles cited above is based on Ethiopia's
insistence on calling the disputed areas as Ethiopian territories. The OAU
Framework and the Modalities made it abundantly clear the fate of the
disputed territories will be decided at the end through delimitation,
demarcation, and possibly arbitration. Ethiopia had accepted the documents
knowing full well that neither documents supported Ethiopia's self-designation
of the territories as Ethiopian. Ethiopia's refusal to stick to the text is a
reminder that it never intended to accept neither the Framework nor the
Modalities as a basis for good faith negotiation for finding a lasting
solution to the conflict.

Question/Clarification sought

Regardless of what the Framework and Modalities have said on the issue of
sovereignty of the disputed areas, Ethiopia continues to assume the
areas are Ethiopian, so much so it insisted on its right to deport people from
there, people it did not care for. It challenged the Technical Arangement's
prohibition of deportation from the areas where civilian administration has
been restored. It argued that the state had a sovereign right to deport anyone
it did deemed a threat to national security without indicating what
constitutes national threat.

OAU's Response

One more time the OAU reminded Ethiopia that ownership, and hence,
sovereignty of the territories cannot be prejudged until a final
determination has been made thorough delimitation and demarcation. To the
extent persons are a threat to national security, first the threat has to
be established through due process in a transparent manner. Given
Ethiopia's record of taking physical characteristics in its definition of
what constitutes national security, the reminder about due process and
transparency is appropriate. Still the fact remains that Ethiopia cannot
assert sovereignty over the disputed areas until the issue has been
determined through the process cited in the Framework, the Modalities, and
the Technical Arrangements.

Question/Clarification sought

Always trying to bring closer the administration in the dispted areas and in
Ethiopia proper, Ethiopia insisted that militia in the disputed areas
carrytheir weapon the same way as militia in the rest of Ethipia do.
Ethiopia wants to know why there's prohibition against display of weapons.
Also there's the question whether militia and police in the disputed area
administered by Ethiopia will have the same functions as police and
militia in the rest of Ethiopia. The implication is clear. Ethiopia wants
to demonstrate why civil administration activities in the disputed areas
cannot be any different from same activities in the rest of Ethiopia,
since in Ethiopia's formulation the disputed territories are Ethiopian.

OAU's Response

While acknowledging that it may be necessary for members of militia to
carry arms, it found that the prohibition was applicable in populated
areas. The response noted that in trying to diffuse armed conflict, it's
important to take building confidence measures to reduce tension. And one
way of building confidence may be by not carrying weapons in public. The
OAU added, rather trenchantly, that "in the climate necessary for the
implementation of a specific agreement on the settlement of an armed
conflict and with an international presence deployed to observe it with
the mutual consent of the two parties, it is not accepted international
practice in such circumstances that individuals may brandish weapons in a
manner that could intimidate the population."

Question/Clarification sought

Ethiopia complains that the reference to grievance resolution through the
auspices of the Peace Keeping Mission was not mandated by the Framework or
Modalities. Again this question, too, was linked to Ethiopia's presumed
sovereignty over the disputed area. The argument is straightforward: for
anyone outside of Ethiopian authorities to enforce peacekeeping measures
on Ethiopian soil, is an attack over Ethiopian sovereignty. Without
waiting for the delimitation and demarcation process, Ethiopia has
single-handedly decided that the territories are Ethiopian, regardless
what the Framework and Modalities said. The continued obsession with Ethiopian
sovereignty in the disputed areas is nothing but a ruse to force Eritrea to
accept Ethiopia's definition of where the borders are.

OAU's Response

The OAU cited specific articles and sections in the Framework and
Modalities to justify "local liaison and grievance resolution mechanisms."
Surely, said the OAU, prior to the establishment of the grievance and
conflict resolution mechanism the concerned parties will be consulted. The
OAU found Ethiopia's fear that it was an attack on its national
sovereignty groundless.

Ethiopia's fixation with asserting sovereignty over the disputed area was
not made without an ulterior motive. The 41 questions are nothing but
amendments to the Technical Arrangments to revise the Framework and the
Modalities to reflect Ethiopia's need. Never mind the fact that the OAU has
said that the Technical Arrangment could not be ammended. Still Ethiopia tried
mightily, sending broad hints that if it did not get its way, it would resort
to war. A blackmail, if ever there was one. The fixation with the disputed
areas as Ethiopian territories is part of Ethiopia's relentless search for the
deal breaker, to insure there's no real movement towards peace.


Ethiopia is convinced that by sheer repetition the claim that the disputed
area are really Ethiopian territories, might stick. If Ethiopia can persuade
the OAU and others to accept Ethiopia's interpretation that the disputed areas
are indeed Ethiopian territories, then there would be no need to proceed with
the current OAU effort. There would be no need to bother with the OAU
Charter's stand on the inviolability of colonial era borders. The slightest
concession made about the territories being Ethiopian, as the mysterious
May 8 Campoare letter tried to do, would enable Ethiopian officials to call
off the impelementation of the Technical Arrangements. Ethiopia would be able
to preempt any reference to "pertinent colonial treaties and international
law" to draw the line on the ground. There would be no need to refer to the
Cairo declaration of 1964.

Once the area has been identified as Ethiopians then what's needed is to
validate Ethiopia's claim to the territories. Delimitation would be
unnecessary and demarcation would be based on what Ethiopia is claiming as its
territories. In effect the 1900, 1902, and 1908 Treaties between Menelik of
Ethiopia and Italy, would be revised to accommodate TPLF's current claim to
Eritrean territories. For Eritrea this means accepting the 1997 Tigray map as
a fact of life, as the minority controlled government of Ethiopia had intended
all along. For Ethiopians in general, it means thousands of Oromos, Amharas
and others perished in the bloody war to enable Tigray to expand its borders
deep into Eritrea.